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Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that regulated firms tend to diversify for different reasons than unregulated 
ones. This is the case for product but also for geographical diversification, i.e. international expansion. 
The logic generally advanced is that regulated firms tend to diversify when they face costly and difficult 
relationships with the regulatory authority in charge of their sector. This approach, however, does not 
explain (1) what is really at the core of the problem in regulated firms’ relationships with regulators, (2) 
why these firms cannot overcome part of the problem by developing nonmarket strategies –lobbying, 
campaign contributions, etc.– to influence regulatory decisions, and (3) why they sometimes opt for 
international expansion rather than product diversification. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model 
that provides potential answers to these questions. We start by considering the firm-regulator 
relationship as an incomplete information problem, in which the firms know things that the regulator 
does not, but can cannot convey hard information about these things. In this setting, we show that when 
firms face tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes 
information transmission credible and therefore strengthen their position in their home market. 
International expansion, in consequence, can be a way to solve some of the problems that regulated firms 
face at home in addition to a way for these firms to grow their business abroad. 
 
JEL: F23, L25, L51 
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1. Introduction 
The question of the international diversification, i.e. the expansion in foreign countries, of regulated firms 
is an understudied yet important question in the economics and management literature (Calzolari, 2004; 
Garcia-Canal and Guillen, 2008; Kashlak and Joshi, 1994). In many cases, international ventures 
implemented by regulated firms have left observers puzzled, the logic underlying these strategic moves 
being seemingly quite different from what was observed in unregulated sectors (Sarkar et al. 1999). In the 
1990s, for instance, many telecommunication operators launched into ambitious international expansions 
which targeted neighbouring developed countries. The underlying logic for these foreign acquisitions left 
investors puzzled.1 Clearly, the lack of growth in home markets and the need to find other sources of 
growth outside were factors that, at least partially, motivated these moves. Also, there could be different 
motives to become a multinational (M), including risk-diversification and increased profitability by 
exploiting specific industrial knowledge in fast-growing markets. However, why invest in developed and 
mature markets and not only in faster growing markets? Why not concentrate on product diversification at 
home, for which incumbent operators seem to have superior capabilities? What are the differential 
benefits from being an entrant or acquiring a former incumbent in the foreign countries where the 
expansion takes place? More generally, are there other expected benefits specific to regulated firms 
driving their international expansion, which have not been considered in the existing literature? The 
purpose of this paper is to provide new answers to this last question.  
To date, there is a large literature on the diversification of regulated firms.2 This literature tends to focus 
on specific reasons, related to their regulated environment, why these firms diversify, and on explanations 
for why these diversification moves often led to little apparent financial success (Gerpott & Jakopin, 
                                                 
1
 See for instance www.lexinter.net/ACTUALITE/france_telecom. 
2
 This literature, however, focuses primarily on the regulatory implications of the topic (i.e., how these 
diversifications should be regulated) and less on the strategic reasons why regulated firms might want to do so 
(Calzolari, 2004; Palmer, 1991; Sappington, 2003).  
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2005; Thomson, 1999). Simply put, the argument in this literature goes like this:3 when regulated firms 
are engaged in hostile and high-transaction cost relationships with their regulatory authority, and since 
they do not have the opportunity to solve this transaction cost problem through vertical integration, they 
tend to diversify out of their core business and in unregulated activities. Russo (1992) finds support for 
this argument for U.S. electric utilities. Kashlak and Joshi (1994) make a similar type of argument but 
point out that, instead of going into unregulated activities, regulated firms might also invest in 
international diversification if the firm’s home market displays slow growth. They also find some 
empirical support for it by looking at U.S. telecommunications operators.  
From a theoretical point of view, however, this literature presents at least three limitations related to (1) 
what makes firm-regulator relationships hostile, (2) the lobbying strategies that the firm could potentially 
use to alleviate these hostile relationships, and (3) the lack of distinction between international and 
product diversification. Below we discuss these three aspects.  
Limitation 1: Firm-regulator hostile relationship.  
Several studies have reported the often-hostile nature of the regulated firms-regulators relationships. In 
public utilities and network industries, in effect, there are plenty of sources of potential disagreements 
between regulated firms and regulators. Among these, one can find (1) the proper valuation of capital 
stock and asset values, essential for setting appropriate tariffs and/or rates of return, (2) the allocation of 
licences to operate and the changing of the rules regarding these licences, or (3) the extent to which new 
entrants should be protected to promote competition (Parker, 2003). However, in the literature on 
regulated firms’ diversification strategies, the real nature of the potentially hostile firm-regulator 
relationships is never clearly expressed. In most empirical studies, the nature of the relationships (from 
                                                 
3
 Here, we leave aside ‘non-strategic’ types of explanations for regulated firms’ diversification, such as for instance 
the free cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). According to this hypothesis, managers of firms with weak internal 
and external governance environments and limited opportunities for profitable growth in their core businesses will 
divert resources into diversifying strategies, even where the latter involve investments with negative net present 
values. This type of argument might explain some of the variance in regulated firms’ diversification performance, 
but we concentrate here on aspects related to firms’ external environment rather than internal and governance 
aspects.  
5 
collaborative to hostile) is measured using variables about the ‘Regulatory Climate’ collected by analysts 
(see for instance Geiger and Hoffman, 1998, or Russo, 1992). These measures are instructive, but they are 
of little help to build a theory of why these relationships impact corporate diversification.  
In what follows, we will propose that the core part of these sometimes hostile relationships is the 
imperfect information faced by the regulator (and the higher political institutions delegating the task) 
when the latter has to make regulatory decisions. As has been highlighted by much literature in Industrial 
Organization, the regulated firms have private information that would be relevant for the regulator and her 
political principals; at the same time, it is also obvious that the firm, the regulator and the delegating 
politicians often have misaligned interests (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). As a result, when the firms try to 
convey soft, i.e. non-verifiable, information to the policy-makers, they face a credibility problem.4 This 
makes the firm-regulator and regulator-politicians relationships difficult, and might thus impact on the 
firm’s decision to diversify out of its core market. 
Limitation 2: Regulated firms’ lobbying (or nonmarket strategies).  
The second limitation of the existing literature on regulated firms’ diversification has to do with their 
capacity to overcome the problems related to their relationships with regulators in other ways than by 
diversifying. Even if these relationships can be hostile, there are alternative strategies that firms can 
develop, such as lobbying or, more generally, nonmarket strategies. Following Baron (2001), we call 
nonmarket strategies all the activities developed by firms to influence policy-makers. Many activities 
belong to nonmarket strategies such as informational lobbying, interest group formation, campaign 
contributions, constituency building, media campaigns, etc. (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). Baron 
(1995) shows examples of how these nonmarket strategies can be effectively integrated with market 
                                                 
4
 There is a literature on how ‘soft’ information can be conveyed to policy-makers (see Grossman and Helpman 
(2001) for a survey). However, it is often difficult for firms to convey this information credibly to a regulator 
because the firm’s payoffs mainly depend on the policy adopted, which is based on the information disclosed (Lyon 
and Maxwell, 2004). Dahm and Porteiro (2008) develop a model of informational lobbying addressing its 
credibility, and argue that it depends on the commitment to disclose all (beneficial and damaging) hard information 
to the regulator. 
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strategies (such as price strategies, differentiation, technology development, diversification, etc.), both in 
the context of domestic or international strategies (Baron, 1997).  
Hence, there are good reasons to believe that regulated firms –at least the incumbents– will be efficient at 
developing these nonmarket strategies since (1) they are large entities and often have deep pockets (de 
Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007), (2) they can build on organized constituencies, especially employees, and 
(3) they generally have superior lobbying skills and capabilities developed through decades of 
interactions with policy-makers (Bonardi, 2004). In a study of U.S. electric utilities, Bonardi, Holburn 
and Vanden Bergh (2006) confirm that these regulated firms develop nonmarket strategies and are often 
successful when they do so.  
So, what role do these nonmarket strategies play in the firm-regulator relationship, and how do they 
impact diversification strategies? When are they effective, and when are they not?  
Limitation 3: Product versus international diversification 
Last, while the existing literature on regulated firms’ nonmarket strategies might explain diversification, it 
cannot disentangle product and geographic diversifications. Both can indeed be strategic options for firms 
wishing to free themselves from hostile regulatory supervision. Does it mean that they are perfect 
substitutes for regulated firms? Or is there something that is achieved only through geographic 
diversification? 
The point that has not been taken into account so far in the literature is that diversification in unregulated 
sectors, regulated sectors or international markets, have very different implications regarding firm-
regulator relationships. Whereas investing in product diversification does little to change these 
relationships, international expansion affects them by helping the regulator to get (or forcing her to take 
into account) comparable information about what the firms are doing in other (also regulated) markets. 
While product diversification allows to partially escape from regulatory intervention (or its incidence over 
7 
global profits), international diversification separates but does not reduce overall regulatory exposure. 
This will be a key aspect of our approach in this paper. 
Objectives of the paper 
In this paper, we provide a theoretical model that makes an explicit assumption regarding Limitation 1, 
and provides new answers to Limitations 2 and 3. As mentioned, the modelling assumption regarding 
firms-regulator relations revolves around the concept of imperfect governance of, and incomplete 
information faced by, the regulatory authority, a traditional set-up in regulatory economics: the regulated 
firm has information that the regulator doesn’t have (for instance regarding its internal costs), which 
makes the task of regulating a sector a difficult one; at the same time, since the regulator can make 
decisions with a large discretion regarding the facts that underlie her judgements (and therefore can 
deviate from the mandate formally governing her actions), (delegating) political administrations and the 
regulated service more generally suffer from potentially inefficient and arbitrary decisions. 
When one concentrates on the regulated firm’s strategy, however, a key aspect is that the firm also lacks 
credibility: in many cases, it communicates soft –and virtually impossible to verify– information, which 
the regulatory authority will hardly believe nor will be forced to take into account; in the best of 
situations, it can affect the support of the distribution of possible states of the world (as perceived by the 
regulator) in its favour. As suggested by Lyon and Maxwell (2004), this creates a difficult situation for 
the firm as well, especially if this firm is competing with other firms or interest groups also providing 
information to the regulator. In this context, we argue that international diversification can be one 
(another, regarding commonly used strategies to transmit information –as presentation of third-party 
technical reports, audits, etc.) strategic way for regulated firms to solve this problem, limiting the 
discretion enjoyed by the regulator in its favour.5 We also show that this has implications for the 
destinations where regulated firms invest: for the firm to use international expansion as a way to build a 
8 
benchmark to make information credible, there needs to be some institutional proximity between the 
home and target countries. Firms that try to build this mechanism will therefore invest in close countries 
more often. On the other hand, firms that do not need to build this benchmark (because they already have 
a strong nonmarket influence over their home regulator) will tend to invest in far (different) countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical motivation for our theoretical 
model by looking at the international strategies of one type of regulated firms: European 
telecommunication operators. Some anomalies with the existing literature are identified. Section 3 puts 
the foundation of a model that could account for some of these anomalies. The formal model itself is 
analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.  
2. Empirical motivation 
In order to motivate our theoretical investigation, we first start with some empirical observations based on 
data about European telecommunication operators. Since our focus here is on regulated firms’ strategies, 
we concentrate our analysis on former national monopolies, i.e. the firms that have been traditionally 
heavily regulated. Arguably, most of these firms have kept strong relationships with national regulatory 
authorities, allowing them to develop nonmarket strategies (Bonardi, 2004). However, new entrants and 
deregulation movements have also generated some variations in the success of these nonmarket 
behaviours.  
Consider first Figure 1 that plots the strategies of former telecom monopolies in Europe. The X-axis 
displays the number of main lines per inhabitant as a proxy for the country’s remaining market potential 
(a high value indicating low market growth potential), and the Y-axis displays the firms’ market shares in 
the wireless market as a proxy for their nonmarket influence over regulatory decisions.6 As one can 
                                                                                                                                                             
5
 See de Figueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999) for an analysis of competition among interest groups, in which 
groups send biased reports to the regulator limiting the discretion and informational advantages of regulators vis-à-
vis political officials. 
6
 Former monopolies’ market shares in the wireless market can be considered proxies for the firm’s nonmarket 
influence in the sense that this market is generally the telephony market that new entrants have attacked first but 
which has also remained heavily dependent on decisions from regulatory authorities. High market shares from the 
9 
expect from existing theories of regulated firms’ strategic behaviours coupled with insights from the 
nonmarket strategy literature, operators in the top left quadrant of Figure 1 should also be the least 
international ones (as measured by the number of foreign countries they have invested in), as they are 
politically strong at home and have sufficient growth potential to exploit there. For the opposite reasons, 
operators in the bottom right should be among the most international ones. 
Note: Number of foreign countries entered by each incumbent indicated after each operator’s name. 
But, is this so? Figure 1 also indicates the internationalization strategy followed by various former 
monopolies, reflected by the number of foreign countries entered by each one of them since 1995.7 We 
can then see that various cases adjust to this prediction (such is the case of Portugal, KPN, Belgacom, 
                                                                                                                                                             
incumbent therefore suggest, at least to some extent, that this firm has been able to protect its rents from new 
entrants’ aggressive attempts (Bonardi et al., Forthcoming).  
7
 Clearly, counting the number of countries is a crude measure of international expansion. We acknowledge this. 
Getting good data on the amount invested by each operator would allow us to contrast our results; however, these 
data were not easily available for most operators, and the prediction of our model has to do in fact with presence 
more than amount invested in close countries abroad. JP: given this, shouldn’t we withdraw this footnote? NOT 
SURE. I THINK THE QUESTION WILL COME UP, SO IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO ADDRESS IT 
RIGHT AWAY. DON’T YOU THINK? 
Figure 1: Expected domestic market growth, nonmarket influence and 
international investment
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British Telecom and Deutsche Telekom). However, different from this theory, there are also operators in 
the top left quadrant that are quite international (especially Spain’s Telefonica). Similarly, there are some 
operators that are both strong at home but operate domestically in mature markets (top right quadrant in 
Figure 1), leaving no clear prediction regarding internationalization according to the existing literature. 
France Telecom and Telia, for instance, internationalize much more than their strong nonmarket influence 
would predict for defensive reasons at home, suggesting their strive for higher growth potential abroad.  
Another question is in which type of countries regulated firms invest. Notice that the existing nonmarket 
strategy literature can also provide partial help in this regard. For instance, Henisz (2003) or Holburn 
(2001) argue that, overtime, regulated firms develop nonmarket capabilities which are specific to certain 
institutional idiosyncrasies, but are also partially transferable from one country to another. Holburn 
(2001) therefore found that operators coming from risky political countries tended to invest more in 
countries that were risky as well. Coming back to our example, one would expect that companies that 
have developed strong nonmarket capabilities to deal with their domestic regulator will expand in 
neighbouring countries (JP: or in former colonies? You mentioned this point…) (SANTIAGO: THE 
PROBLEM IS THAT I DIDN’T CODE THINGS THIS WAY. MOST FORMER COLONIES ARE 
CONSIDERED AS BEING ‘FAR COUNTRIES’ IN THE CURRENT GRAPH. I WOULD LEAVE 
THIS COMMENT OUT), in which they can leverage these capabilities. Or, to put it in our empirical 
setting, the prediction would be that European companies that have kept high market shares in their 
domestic wireless market would tend to invest more in close (i.e., mature) countries.  
To explore this (again, as an example to motivate our theoretical development), we calculate an “index of 
alike internationalization” as the ratio of the number of neighbour countries divided by the total number 
of countries in which the operator has invested.8 In Figure 2 we plot this index (on the Y axis) with the 
                                                 
8
 In Figure 2, we consider only the operators that were present in more than 2 foreign countries. Neighbour countries 
are European countries. JP: I think that, if possible, we should revise the definition of neighbour countries (not 
only European ones, but also those in the same quadrant in Figure 1) and see what happens with Figure 2. 
The geographical proximity used in Figure 2 is less appealing than a definition combining geographical, 
institutional and structural similarities (mixing location, nonmarket power of incumbents and growth 
11 
operator’s remaining market shares in the wireless segment (again, as a proxy of the firm’s nonmarket 
influence at home). The outcome is quite sharp: all the operators are positioned either in the top left or the 
bottom right segments of the graph. On the top left quadrant are operators that have a relatively low 
nonmarket influence/capabilities and which have decided to concentrate their international investment on 
neighbouring countries. Operators on the bottom right segment, who have strong nonmarket 
influence/capabilities in their home market, tend to invest in countries that are (relatively) farther from 
them institutionally. This picture seems to be at odds with the literature cited above. It doesn’t support the 
‘nonmarket capabilities’ perspective, under which companies would tend to leverage their nonmarket 
capabilities in countries with similar institutional/market settings/parameters. On the other hand, it seems 
to predict that companies that face a nonmarket disadvantage domestically will tend to invest nearby, 
whether companies that hold a nonmarket advantage domestically invest farther from home. 
                                                                                                                                                             
potential), which is closer to what we discuss in the model…. I’M GONNA TRY TO WORK ON THIS. NOT 
SURE HOW EASY IT WILL BE TO COMBINE THESE THINGS WITHOUT MAKING THINGS HARD 
TO READ, BUT I’LL TRY… 
Figure 2: Location of European operators international investment
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How can this be explained? In what follows, we suggest that, aside from the nonmarket capabilities 
presented above, there might be another potential set of nonmarket factors that influences regulated firms’ 
international expansion: the exploitation of information and visibility collected abroad used as a way to 
improve the firm’s nonmarket position at home. If firms face a credibility deficit when they deal with 
domestic regulators and cannot easily compensate for this through alternative nonmarket tactics (like 
campaign contributions, for instance, as in de Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007), they might increase the 
impact of their informational lobbying by providing comparative benchmarks coming from their foreign 
investments. This might be a key driver of these (but not all) operators’ international expansion. On the 
other hand, regulated firms that are not too challenged domestically might invest abroad for totally 
different reasons. For these firms, like France Telecom in our sample, investing in close countries might 
not be a critical factor. We demonstrate this formally in the model below.  
JP: Result of consulting with top management of BT, DT and/or FT should be reported here… 
AGREED. 
3. Model assumptions 
We consider one sector that has been traditionally regulated and builds on an infrastructure network (i.e., 
for instance, telecommunications or electricity), in one country. The policy issue has to do with the 
determination of an access-price (for fixed, wire-line services) that an entrant firm has to pay to the 
incumbent and owner of the involved infrastructure. The game includes one regulator (R) and two 
firms/interests, denoted by j=I,E: one firm is the incumbent (I) and the other one is the entrant (E).9 We 
consider first a case where each firm is purely domestic, and then analyze changes when one firm expands 
in a foreign country. Final users (and governments in general) benefit when the policies implemented 
adjust well to the true underlying conditions (state of nature), which is more likely when the regulator 
enjoys less discretion and is required to base her decisions on publicly available elements. 
13 
In order to capture the basic intuition, various simplifying assumptions are adopted. First, we make some 
ad-hoc assumptions which, although we consider reasonable, minimize the theoretical options regarding 
possible signalling games oriented to transmit private information. Second, we assume that first-best 
regulation (i.e., marginal cost pricing) is feasible under complete information.10 
3.1. The firms and the regulator 
As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) or Grossman and Helpman (1994), the two interests behave as 
principals that seek to contract with the regulatory authority for the policy; the regulatory authority is thus 
a (de facto) common agent of the two interests.11 The regulator, in turn, is the formal agent of higher 
political government institutions (who we assume truly represent final users of the regulated service). 
Objective functions for the regulator and the firms are built upon quadratic loss-functions regarding the 
most preferred policies by each agent (Baron, 2001); firms lobby for their most desired policy through 
transfers/support transmitted to the regulator; the regulator balances efficiency (consumers representation 
or industry performance based on available information) and its private interest (support received from 
interest groups –regulated firms–, minus expected penalties to be incurred in case she is proved to be 
adopting biased or inefficient decisions). 
A key assumption in our model, then, is that regulators tend to adopt policies that ‘cover their back’. By 
this we mean that an important aspect for regulators is to avoid being penalized by governing politicians 
that supervise them. Hence, when a piece of information that might have some credibility is signalled to 
politicians, it will be costly for regulators to ignore it (Bonardi, Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2006). Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 The disputes between incumbents and entrants are of course extended beyond the access price for the use of the 
existing fixed, wire-line infrastructure, but we use this dimension as an illustration of the general conflict between 
firms with opposed interests at home. 
10
 In particular, fixed network costs or economies of scale are disregarded. Access pricing in the context of Ramsey 
pricing (optimal deviations from marginal cost due to budget constraints and linear pricing) is primarily discussed in 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996). 
11
 The common agency model here is not one of formal delegation, but instead one where principals exert 
“economic influence” on a common agent, who cannot refuse to act as such. The incentives or support can be 
offered through various means discussed in the literature, such as campaign contributions, voice opposition or 
acceptance of their general policy initiatives, future employment, or just economic bribes. 
14 
as long as regulators can relatively credibly justify their policy choices using this piece of information, 
their ‘back is covered’. This assumption fits with regulatory practices as explicated by Hyman (2000). 
One needs to note, also, that the modelling implication of this assumption is that regulators generally do 
not set up truth revealing incentive mechanisms in order to obtain the best information they can. Less is 
so the case for government officials dealing with multiple issues and delegating regulation to specialized 
bodies. So, even if this mechanism would seem to be more elegant and in line with now standard 
information economics models (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), we prefer here to concentrate on keeping our 
model closer to real practice as we perceive it.  
In order to maximize efficiency –for a given set of transfers or supports received from regulated firms–, 
the regulator must base her decision on her information regarding the cost of providing access to the 
existing network operated by the incumbent firm: an access price set too high would allow the incumbent 
to retain excessive monopoly rents, whereas an access price set too low would eventually lead to a 
deterioration of the network coverage and/or quality, ultimately hurting final users (i.e. overall 
performance) of the regulated services in both cases. Thus, since the regulator is imperfectly informed 
about the true cost of access, her decision could be biased away from efficiency; to minimize this bias, 
higher political government officials (and final users) would welcome credible information that forces the 
regulator to minimize the potential error of her cost estimate. 
3.2. Network costs, information and reports 
The marginal cost of the existing network is given by C(δ), where δ is a vector of both idiosyncratic and 
common parameters (such as country-size, income, density, cost of capital, available technology adjusting 
to those conditions, etc.); C(δ) can be positively correlated across different countries depending on their 
structural similarities regarding their key parameters δ. 
The informational assumption is that (all) firms know δ in the countries where they participate, but neither 
the regulator nor higher political government officials (G) do (more precisely, the regulator receives an 
15 
unbiased signal from nature –which is in fact her honest deconstruction of all the evidence consulted in 
order to determine those parameters–, but higher political government officials are fully uninformed).12 
Firms supply reports with information about the state of the world regarding δ, which contains both 
“hard” (verifiable) and “soft” (unverifiable) information. Verifiable information truncates the support of 
the cost function within which R receives the unbiased signal from nature: the hard (but selective) 
information supplied by the firms convinces R that δmax≥ δ≥ δmin; unverifiable information is used by R to 
construct its prior belief about the cost C. Thus, both R and G understand that firms could safely report 
C(δr), where δrj Є [δmin, δmax].13 
The regulator has only one instrument at hand: setting an access price (a), which in turn determines both 
the benefits obtained by the incumbent and the entrant, and the overall performance of the sector.14  
When one of the firms is a multinational (M), the report it sends can have different advantages regarding 
its credibility. First, it could become more compelling or credible for both R and G because some of the 
determinants of the network costs are common across countries (i.e., M is in a better position to convey 
information about the other country’s situation in a more coherent and credible way), and/or because M’s 
various reports have to be relatively consistent across countries and thus it would provide less biased 
reports (i.e., some relatively damaging hard information –for instance, if M is the incumbent, it might 
provide information allowing a reduction in δmax). Second, even if R is not further convinced by this new 
piece of information (because she had already consulted it on her own, or because there is no increased 
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 Thus, contrary to the most usual agency settings where the agent is better informed than the principal(s), in our 
model the two principals (firms) perfectly observe the action taken by the agent (her policy decision a) and they are 
both better informed than the agent regarding the state of nature (δ). 
13
 Since foreign regulation might be biased and each vector δ partly reflects intrinsic characteristics of each country, 
pure imitation (of foreign regulation) is generally undesirable. More generally also, multinational firms cannot be 
penalized for reporting different δ in different countries.  
14
 This happens once the final price of services Pf is no fully adjusted to reflect different access prices. So, we 
implicitly assume that Pf and a are partly (but not fully) correlated: i) if Pf and the a change in the same amount, the 
entrant’s margin “m” (=Pf-a) would not vary with a, and this would contradict our assumption about the entrant’s 
utility function (preferring a lower access price); ii) if Pf remained constant when a changes, no effect on final 
performance would emerge from various different levels of access price (its effects would be purely on the division 
of rents between firms, which is not important for final consumers). See Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996). 
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consistency implication), G would now know that such information was indeed exposed to R during the 
regulatory proceedings, and could adopt it as its own prior or benchmark to examine R’s choices implying 
deviations from it. Third, G might be less aware than R about the idiosyncratic differences of costs across 
(otherwise similar) countries, and thus adopt this (visible) report as its own prior on which to base its 
posterior monitoring activity. 
In this paper, and only for modelling reasons, we adopt the following assumption: a report by M does not 
modify C’s support (i.e., [C(δmin), C(δmax)] remains unchanged), but it becomes the expected policy by G, 
forcing R to justify more carefully –and costly– policies deviating from it. Thus, higher level political 
government officials monitor R’s use of the information supplied by M, inducing her to give more weight 
to M’s reports as the correlation of network costs across countries is expected to be higher. 
3.3. Games sequence 
The sequence of the game is the following: 
- first, nature chooses the vector δ of idiosyncratic and common technology parameters; 
- second, government officials state their monitoring strategy regarding the policy chosen by the 
regulator, including the penalties they with apply on her if she is found to be following her own 
agenda (making biased decisions by neglecting some verifiable information submitted by the 
regulated firms); 
- third, firms observe the true δ in the countries where they participate and send signals (reports 
C(δrj)) which inform R that C’s support is [C(δmin), C(δmax)]; 
- fourth, firms exert pressure on the regulator in order to affect the price of access she will set; 
- fifth, the regulator implements policy (sets the access price a*) based on the incentives faced (the 
information collected, the pressure of firms in the political regulatory process, and the expected 
penalty for disregarding verifiable information supplied by regulated firms); 
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- last, payoffs develop. 
The Nash equilibrium of this incomplete information game is solved backwards: given the informational 
lobbying directed to convince the regulator about favourable costs of access, both firms –anticipating the 
regulators’ reaction function– simultaneously choose their supports, and then given these decisions, 
policy is implemented by the regulatory authority. 
4. Model analysis 
As pointed out, the key issue for the regulator is the determination of the access price, a, within an 
interval depending of possible values of C(δ) as shown in Figure 3 below: a Є [Cmin,Cmax]. a*=C would be 
the first-best policy. The unbiased signal (within C’s support resulting from the reports and information 
collected) received by R determines her prior belief about C, called CP. 
Figure 3: policy space 
 
 
The utility function for firm j=I,E is: 
uj (a) = – αj × (a–C j)2, 
where C j denotes firm j’s preferred report (incumbents prefer Cmax –i.e., CI=Cmax– and entrants prefer Cmin 
–i.e., CE=Cmin), αj denotes the importance of the policy for firm j, and it turns out to also represent the 
nonmarket strength or influence of this firm in the regulatory game.15 (Of course, these utilities are 
negative unless we add a positive constant, but the important fact is that the maximum level is reached at 
a*=C j and that the marginal disutility increases with further departures from this point.) 
Firms offer supports sj(a), and policy preferences for each firm are the following: Uj = uj(a)–sj(a). For 
simplicity, the support functions are assumed linear, in the following way: )()( EI Caas −×= ω  and 
                                                 
15
 The strength surely depends on several other things, including the political importance of the firm in its country, 
its role as a major employer, the support of trade unions, etc., but we only represent its own economic stake as a 
determinant of the resources dedicated and useful to shape public policy. 
Cmin C  a Cmax CP 
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)()( aCas IE −×= λ . That is, the incumbent transfers to the regulator ω per unit of deviation from its less 
desired policy (CE) and the entrant pays her λ per unit of deviation from his own less desired policy (CI). 
Thus, 0)( ≥asI  and 0)( ≥asE . 
While in a “truthful equilibrium” (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) the marginal supports offered by each 
principal reflect their marginal utilities for each feasible policy chosen by the agent (and these are 
decreasing as they approach each principals’ preferred point), we restrict attention to linear incentive 
schemes for three main reasons. First, because at the equilibrium (correctly anticipated by each principal) 
the linear incentive schemes do coincide with each principals’ marginal utility. Second, because we find 
unrealistic that the regulated firms formally expose a support function announcing each marginal reward 
attached to all possible actions taken by the regulator, and thus the agent would at most perceive rewards 
as linear schemes (and react accordingly to them). Third, working with linear incentive functions 
simplifies the mathematical solution of the model. 
More generally, even though our restriction implies that the support functions are not truthful everywhere, 
they are truthful at the equilibrium (i.e., they reflect the marginal utility derived from the equilibrium 
policy chosen by the agent), and they are “relatively truthful” off-the equilibrium, leading to a unique 
Nash equilibrium. In other words, this would be an example of what Bernheim and Whinston (1986) 
describe as “an irrelevant way” in which equilibrium (linear) strategies depart from (fully) truthful ones. 
The outcome for consumers –allocative efficiency P– symmetrically depends on the difference between 
the access price and the true marginal cost of access, i.e., .)()( 2CaaP −×−= θ  (Ex-ante, though, 
expected performance is maximized when a*=CP.) That is, setting an access price above the marginal cost 
of access to the network triggers a higher final price Pf that hurts consumers, whereas an access price 
below that cost leads to a deterioration of investment to maintain and expand the network, also hurting 
final users. 
4.1. Regulator and firms’ nonmarket strategies 
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In the model, we concentrate in two types of nonmarket strategies: (1) support (of any kind) provided by 
firms to the regulator (as in Baron, 2001), and (2) informational lobbying to convey soft information. 
Since both firms (the incumbent and the entrant) provide nonmarket support in favour of certain 
regulatory decisions, the regulator is assumed to balance the support received from the interest groups 
(regulated firms I and E) with its intrinsic willingness for good performance (as representing consumers’ 
surplus or allocative efficiency out of first-best policy or marginal cost pricing), so that: 
UR = P(a) + sI(a) + sE(a). 
Since R does not observe δ (within [δmin, δmax]), her decisions are based on her beliefs on it. At the same 
time, without any other constraint by their political superiors, R can justify any policy she chooses based 
on δ Є [δmin, δmax] as the optimal performance attainable given the information she has about δ. Indeed, 
even though the higher political officials are fully uninformed regarding the support of the cost function, 
the two firms do know what is the support within which R has to make a decision and could claim a 
review if she steps outside such range. Without loss of generality, we assume that R’s expected cost (CP) 
is equally distant from C(δmin) and C(δmax) (i.e., (CP) = [C(δmin)+C(δmax)]/2), and that both firms know this. 
 
Can a multinational firm become more credible and send a report to which the regulator gives a higher 
weight? Based on the discussion at the end of Section 3.2, it can. In particular, the regulator could be 
penalized if she is found to have overlooked or minimized information from another comparable country 
submitted during the regulatory process, and since multinationals have much better access to such 
information than other parties, firms obtain a strategic advantage through internationalization. The 
magnitude of this advantage depends on the expected penalties faced the regulator, which in turn depend 
on the importance given to the foreign country as an information benchmark by the higher political 
officials themselves (something known before the firms play out their strategies in front of the regulator –
see the time sequence spelled out before). In general, then, if a regulator faces a multinational, her 
20 
discretion is reduced, as she needs to implement a policy that gives more (or even full) weight to the 
information supplied by M. 
As regards the utility function of the regulator once such penalties are feasible, the linear translation of the 
assumption spelled out in Section 3.2 results in the following: 
,)()()()( 22 MEIPR CaFaSaSCaU −×−++−×−= θ  
where the last term is added reflecting the increased cost for R if she deviates from the report CM (either 
due to the risk of being penalized by G, or because of the more careful justification for increasing 
departures of the policy implied by such report).  
Yet, for the sake of simplicity in the exposition (and posterior computations), the first and third terms of 
the function above could be (imperfectly) combined, and re-express R’s utility function in the following 
way: 
),()()( 2 aSaSCaU EIPMR ++−×−=
∧
θ  
where θθ >
∧
 represents the higher disutility (including the expected penalty and/or the effort to justify a 
policy based on own information) that R faces when the policy chosen deviates from the one she is 
supposed to implement, which now instead of being her prior CP becomes a prior which gives more 
weight to the report CM (or δrM) sent in by the multinational firm.16  In other words, the use that G gives to 
the report CM ends up reflecting changes in the decisions adopted by R as if she cared more about the 
performance of the sector ( θθ >
∧
) and had a prior belief CPM closer to the preferred policy by the 
multinational firm (i.e., CI >CM >CPM>CP). Naturally, as the penalty F tends to disappear (reaching in the 
                                                 
16
 Notice that if R did adopt M’s report as her new expected cost of access, the simplification made here would be 
fully correct: CP and CM would now coincide, and thus 22 )()()()( MEIPR CaFaSaSCaU −×−++−×−= θ  
would reduce to )()()()( 2 aSaSCaFU EIMR ++−×+−= θ , so that, in the last equation, F+=
∧
θθ and 
CPM=CM. 
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end the case when there is no multinational), R’s parameters of its utility function tend to those defined in 
the absence of multinational firms. Notice that if both the incumbent and the entrant in a given country 
are multinational firms, then the regulator would have to combine the (conflicting) information provided 
by both of them, using each report as relative proof to empirically base her decision according to the 
different weights she believes (or as announced) G would give to the different sources (i.e., trying to 
adjust its policy to the optimal one that would be taken by the politicians themselves based on the 
importance they give to the information supplied by the two firms, which depends on which foreign 
countries they use for their reports). In that regard, the discretion enjoyed by the regulator is further 
reduced, and thus the productivity of each transfer offered by the two firms is also lower, reducing the 
rents retained by the regulator. 
4.2. Complete information                               
Under complete information, a simple (first-best) solution is reached: a*= C(δ). This is derived from the 
regulator’s utility function when sI(a)=sE(a)=0, as has to be the case since with complete information the 
regulator would be caught to be responding to interest groups –and would presumably be heavily 
penalized by political superiors or courts– if a*≠ C(δ). The outcome in this case displays marginal cost 
pricing, and no space for the development of a credibility problem. In fact, no nonmarket strategies could 
take place once the regulator could not justify departing from first-best policies herself. 
The general case of regulated sectors, however, is one of incomplete information. As explained before, 
this is what creates the sometimes hostile relationships between the regulated firms and the regulator. So, 
what happens under incomplete information in our setting when firms are purely domestic actors? Below 
we explore the nature and implications of incomplete information about the “true state of the world”. 
4.3. Incomplete information but no multinational firm 
Under our previous assumptions, and leaving aside the verifiable components of the reports that define 
the range of possible costs (i.e. [C(δmin),C(δmax)]), the soft reports sent in by each firm cannot be verified 
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in a court of law, and thus it is completely up to the regulator to announce what is her conclusion 
regarding the true state of nature within this range. So, whatever decision is made by R within this range, 
no penalty can be imposed on her. Thus, once the support of the cost function [C(δmin),C(δmax)] is 
determined (and known by the regulator and the two firms), the common agency equilibrium 
)),(),(( *** aasas EI  is defined as: 
∈*a
 maxarga )()()( ** asasaP EI ++  
with (.)))(.),((](.))(.),([maxarg)( **2**(.)* EIIIEIIsI ssasCssaas I −−×−∈ α  
and (.)))(.),((](.))(.),([maxarg)( **2**(.)* EIEEEIEsE ssasCssaas E −−×−∈ α . 
We assume that the two principals (firms) decide on their support schedules first and then the agent 
(regulator) reacts to them. Nevertheless, when the firms make their choice, each of them incorporates the 
regulator’s reaction function, as determined by the first-order condition of her optimization problem. As 
each principal makes a punctual prediction of the support schedule offered by the other principal, but both 
recognize that the agent will optimally react to their aggregated support schedules, an equilibrium 
requires that those predictions are correct. 
From the convexity of the utility functions of all players, an interior solution for the two support 
schedules falls short from a coordinated solution between the two principals, whereby they would agree 
on the overall incentive to be provided to the agent. Furthermore, assuming that the support schedules are 
differentiable, the interior solution is obtained in the following way. First, from R’s problem, the first-
order condition yields PCa +−=
θ
λω
2
)(
* . Then, if the two principals cannot offer supports (ω=λ=0) or 
simply their supports balance out as they provide equal absolute incentives to the regulator (ω*=λ*), the 
equilibrium access-price a* is set at the expected (prior) best-policy level CP = E(C). (The chosen policy, 
though, could turn out to be ex-post inefficient if the signal received by R was biased.) 
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Second, taking into account R’s reaction function into their own problems (i.e., replacing the previous 
expression for a* into their optimization problems), both competing firms decide on their support 
schedules (i.e., on the values of ω* and λ* ), according to the following two first-order conditions: 
[ ] ][ ,02/2/)(2/)()/(: =−−+−−−+−− θωθλωθλωθαω EPIPI CCCC  
[ ] ][ .02/2/)(2/)()/(: =−−+−+−+−+ θλθλωθλωθαλ IPEPE CCCC  
Solving this system of equations for an interior solution, we have:17 
[ ] ),3/()()2()(2 2* θααααθθαω ++−+−++−−= IEIEIEEIPIPI CCCCCCC  
[ ] ).3/()()2()(2 2* θααααθθαλ ++−+−++−= IEEIIEIEPEPE CCCCCCC  
From these two equations we obtain: 
[ ] ),3/()2()()(2** θααθααθλω ++−++−+−=− IEPEIPIIPEE CCCCCCC  
and replacing this expression into the regulator’s choice function PCa +−=
θ
λω
2
)(
* , we have: 
[ ] PIEPEIPIIPEE CCCCCCCCa +++−++−+−= )3/()2()()(* θααθαα . 
From the first one of the last two equations, it is easy to characterize the symmetric case: if the two firms 
have the same intensity of preferences or capacity to influence the regulatory policy (i.e., if αE=αI), and 
R’s expected value CP is half-way between the two extreme policies supported by the interest groups (i.e., 
if CP=(CI+CE)/2), then λ*=ω*, leading to a*= CP. So, under this scenario, if the true state of nature C 
coincides with CP, the policy implemented matches the first-best that maximizes performance P(a): in the 
symmetric case where the two interests have equally intensive preferences and are also equally distant 
from the expected state of nature CP regarding their preferred policies, the (marginal) supports offered by 
                                                 
17
 The interior solution requires that the preferences of the firms regarding the policy to be implemented (αI and αE) 
are larger than the marginal impact of policy on performance (or, in other words, the intrinsic policy preference of 
the regulator, θ): if this is not the case, then there is no room for profitable exchanges of supports and policies. 
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each regulated firm are the same, and the policy chosen by R turns out to be the one that maximizes 
expected allocative performance P(a). 
We can also verify that when CP=(CI+CE)/2, then ω*>λ* if αI>αE, which means that the most interested 
principal offers the highest support. In that sense, policies adopted will generally be ex-ante biased with 
respect to R’s belief (as long as the strength of principals through nonmarket strategies are unequal), but 
the biases cannot be proved ex-post by any one of the participants. Thus, it is natural that higher political 
government officials (G) regret R’s discretion and would prefer to find ways to audit her decisions or 
force her to reduce such discretion. They would welcome, of course, information that minimizes the risk 
of implementing an ex–post biased policy regarding the true state of nature C. 
More generally, from the last equation, and recalling that CI>CP>CE, we can check that a* increases with 
CP, it decreases with αE and it increases with αI. Also, a* moves closer to CP when θ increases, i.e., when 
the performance is more affected by the policy chosen.18 
The numerical example developed in Table 1 below illustrates these various results: 
Table 1: Policy and rents in the incomplete information equilibrium without 
multinational firms 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Fully honest 
regulator  Benchmark Coordination αI goes up θ goes up C
P
 goes up 
Values of parameters 
αI 2 2 2 3 2 2 
αE 2 2 2 2 2 2 
θ  2 1 1 1 1,5 1 
CP 3 3 3 3 3 4 
CI 5 5 5 5 5 5 
CE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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 When 
,
2
)( EIP CCC += then [ ] ,)3/()()(3* 2θααααθ ++−×−×=∂
∂
IEIE
EP CCa and thus the signs of 
θ∂
∂ *a and IE αα −  
coincide, meaning that, when θ increases, a* tends to move to the centre of C’s distribution from the biased choice 
induced by the stronger interest group (i.e., if IE αα > , then a* would initially be downward biased –towards the 
entrant’s preference–, but would then increase –reduce its bias– as the impact of policy on efficiency –θ– increases). 
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Equilibrium values of supports, policy and utilities 
ω*  0,00 4,00 0,00 6,00 2,00 3,14 
λ* 0,00 4,00 0,00 5,50 2,00 4,86 
 ω*+ λ* 0,00 8,00 0,00 11,50 4,00 8,00 
ω* - λ* 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 -1,71 
a* 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,25 3,00 3,14 
UI -8,00 -16,00 -8,00 -22,69 -12,00 -13,63 
UE -8,00 -16,00 -8,00 -19,75 -12,00 -18,20 
UR 0,00 8,00 0,00 11,44 4,00 7,27 
So, reading the results progressively from columns 1 to 6 of Table 1, we find: 
1. If θ is equal or higher than αI and αE, then –as would be the case with a fully honest regulator– 
supports ω and λ are zero (they cannot be negative), and the access price a* equals R’s belief 
about C (i.e., CP); 
2. If θ is lower than αI and αE, an interior solution develops; in the symmetric case (which we use as 
the benchmark to derive other results), both firms offer positive transfers, the regulator receives a 
positive rent, but policy is unbiased as marginal transfers are equal to each other;  
3. If both firms I and E could coordinate their transfers, and offer no support (ω=0 and λ=0), then 
the policy a* remains the same, but R’s rents disappear (UR=0); 
4. When αI increases, both firms increase their marginal supports, and policy a* is biased towards 
I’s preferred one; yet, only R benefits from this situation (both I and E end up being worse-off); 
5. When θ increases, transfers are reduced, policy remains unbiased, I and E’s utilities go up, and 
R’s utility goes down; 
6. When CP goes up, I’s marginal support ω decreases and E’s marginal support λ increases, biasing 
policy towards E’s preference relative to the new CP; I is better off, but E and R are worse off. 
We can thus state the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: Without multinationals, the regulatory game departs from the expected first-best 
policy depending on the relative nonmarket strength of each firm (incumbent and entrant); ex-
post, the deviation might also result from a biased signal received by the regulator. The 
magnitude of the expected departure decreases when the regulatory decision is more significant 
in affecting the performance of the sector. In general, the access price increases (decreases) as 
the incumbent (entrant) has more nonmarket influence. Under symmetric conditions, even though 
the regulated access price coincides with the expected first-best price, both regulated firms spend 
resources to balance each other’s influence, leaving rents to the regulators. 
Presumably, (incumbent) regulated firms will have less incentive to invest in geographical diversification 
if they can offer significant support to (i.e., exert high pressure on) the regulator and therefore dominate 
entrants in the political game. In most cases (particularly when the country’s regulatory policy embraces 
competition and entry), however, the situation will be more symmetrical in the nonmarket arena and the 
regulated firm will have to face entrants that will match their political investment, force them to push their 
own lobbying investment higher, and will therefore lead to a poor outcome in terms of regulated access 
price and allowed profits. This approach therefore provides an explanation for why regulated firms, in 
many cases, cannot effectively rely on nonmarket strategies to overcome the problem they face regarding 
the regulator (as highlighted with Limitation 2 in the introduction). This is why (ceteris paribus) 
geographical diversification becomes one of the best options for some regulated firms. 
4.4. Internationally diversified regulated firms 
Assume first that only one of the two regulated firms (say the incumbent, I) is a multinational with 
business in a country where the cost of access is known to be positively correlated with the one to be 
determined by the home regulator. Thus, by providing this additional information in an enhanced report, 
which we have assumed is firmly believed by higher government political officials (G), the regulator is 
faced with a possible penalty imposed by their political superiors if she disregards (or fails to properly 
justify its demerits) the information supplied by multinationals. To eliminate the expected penalty, the 
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regulator could simply give full attention to M’s report; yet, if she was anticipated to behave in this way, 
both firms would not offer any supports, bringing to zero the regulator’s rents. In general, R could depart 
from M’s report by carefully providing arguments that justify differences between the cost of access in the 
two involved countries, and thus will balance out the higher expected cost suffered by deviating form the 
policy fully based on M’s report with the benefits derived from the supports she is offered, still leading to 
an interior solution now –ceteris paribus– biased vis-à-vis the expected first-best policy. Indeed, both 
firms anticipate the higher cost suffered by R if she deviates from the policy justifiable under M’s report, 
and will thus compute their transfers (supports) appropriately ex–ante. 
Notice that the expected penalty is presumably higher and increases more rapidly when the two countries 
involved are “closer” to each other (the costs of the two incumbents are more correlated, and the 
expectation that R should rely on the other country’s revealed information is higher), providing in this 
case higher benefits for being M. Indeed, part of the higher credibility attached to M’s report is natural 
due to the fact that a biased report could be exposed by a proper comparison with its report presented in 
the foreign country, causing eventually an embarrassment or damage to the public image of the 
multinational firm (notice that such credibility, thus, should be higher when M is an incumbent in one 
country and an entrant in another one since the inconsistency of reports would otherwise be maximum, 
but the idea is more general than this as there always is some sacrifice in the amount of possible 
misrepresentation across countries if the involved firm is a multinational acting in both of them). 
As before, firms offer supports sj(a) and supply biased information to the regulator. Given our previous 
simplifying modelling assumptions (spelled out in Section 3.2), the transfers offered by the firms adjust to 
the new parameters of R’s utility function, i.e., with higher θ ( θθ >
∧
, as R’s intrinsic disutility regarding 
poor performance is composed with the higher cost needed to justify her decisions when these move away 
from the expected policy by G), and increased prior belief CP (now replaced by CPM>CP). That is, relative 
to the absence of a multinational firm, the equilibrium corresponds to a situation where both CP and θ 
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simultaneously increase. From the previous results in Table 1, and assuming that the multinational is the 
incumbent (see columns 5 and 6), we can see that: 
i) When θ increases, marginal transfers λ* and ω* are reduced, policy a* remains unbiased, I and E’s 
utilities go up, and R’s utility goes down; 
ii) When CP goes up, I’s support ω* decreases and E’s support λ* increases, biasing policy towards 
E’s preference relative to the new CP; yet, compared with the benchmark case where  
2
)( EIP CCC += , I is better off, but E and R are both worse off. 
So, combining the two effects, Table 2 below contains some numerical illustrations showing that when I 
is a multinational, so that both CP and θ increase, then: 
a) ω* goes down, and even though λ* could go up, still we have that ω*+λ* (i.e., the aggregate level 
of marginal transfers received by R in equilibrium) goes always down; 
b) a* goes up (although not as much as CP), 
c) U I goes always up and U R goes always down, but U E can go up or down (it is hurt by the 
intention to implement C M > E(C), but it is benefited by the fact that both firms reduce their 
marginal transfers once the regulator is less responsive to them). 
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This can be summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When one of the regulated firms is a multinational, the policy implemented moves 
towards its report, introducing an ex-ante bias regarding the symmetric case, but reducing the 
scope of discretion enjoyed by the regulator; also, marginal supports offered by each firm would 
normally go down, but even if they individually don’t, their sum will do so in equilibrium, 
reducing the utility obtained by the regulator; finally, while the utility of the firm becoming a 
multinational increases due to the higher credibility and incidence of its report, the utility 
reached by the opposing firm could either increase or decrease. 
Notice that if the benchmark (without M) situation was instead one of asymmetric nonmarket power, the 
participation of a multinational could reduce or increase the implemented policy bias vis-à-vis the 
expected first-best depending on who had relatively higher political strength prior to the higher credibility 
Table 2: Policy and rents with a multinational (I=M; θ and CP both go up) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Benchmark Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5 
Values of parameters 
αI 2 2 2 2 2 2 
αE 2 2 2 2 2 2 
θ  1 1,5 1,2 1,8 1,5 1,5 
C P 3 4 4 4 3,5 4,5 
C I 5 5 5 5 5 5 
C E 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Equilibrium values of supports, policy and utilities 
ω*  4,00 0,76 2,19 -0,66 1,38 0,15 
λ* 4,00 3,24 4,21 2,26 2,62 3,85 
ω*+ λ* 8,00 4,00 6,40 1,60 4,00 4,00 
ω* - λ* 0,00 -2,47 -2,02 -2,91 -1,24 -3,71 
a* 3,00 3,18 3,16 3,19 3,09 3,26 
U I -16,00 -8,31 -11,51 -5,11 -10,20 -6,36 
U E -16,00 -15,37 -17,07 -13,68 -13,73 -16,94 
U R 8,00 2,98 5,55 0,42 3,75 1,71 
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gained by the diversification. Yet, while this possibility would make the ex-post effect on the higher 
political officials (and final users) undefined, the reduced range of the possible bias benefits G ex-ante. 
We can assume that the expected penalties imposed on regulators if they disregard (choose to discard 
without justification) reports by M are positively related to the similarities between the two countries with 
respect to their regulatory environments: if there are closer cultural, geographical and/or institutional links 
between those countries, the importance given by G to such international information becomes very high, 
whereas such importance (and thus the expected cost faced by R for deviating from such report) is 
relatively minor when the two countries are “distant from each other” (in those same dimensions). Thus, it 
is straightforward to conclude that the benefits from internationalization (additional to other benefits and 
costs not examined here) are higher when the two countries where the multinational acts are “close to 
each other” –i.e., sufficiently similar and connected regarding their regulatory systems. In other words, 
the credibility gained by being in two countries that are highly communicated and transparent (to each 
other) is higher than if the multinational acts in markets whose information flows are poor or where the 
idiosyncratic information in one country is not very relevant to strengthen the credibility of the report 
about the idiosyncratic parameter in the other country. 
Finally, notice that the enhanced credibility coming from M’s report is not related to the size of the 
investment abroad: therefore, while returns for investments abroad that are decided for the traditional 
reasons presumably depend on the amount invested, the diversifications in close countries directed to gain 
credibility might be of limited amounts, just enough to become a relevant player capable of collecting the 
information to be supplied to the home regulator (and indirectly then to higher political officials). 
Our database does not allow us to check this point in general, but we find initial support by comparing the 
cases of British Telecom (BT) and France Telecom (FT). Recall that, according to Figure 2, BT is 
characterized as a company whose investments abroad might be particularly motivated by the strategic 
consideration we develop in the paper (i.e., it is weak regarding nonmarket strategies in the UK and thus 
seeks to improve its home position by investing in neighbouring countries), while FT has the opposite 
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situation (its home strength seems to be quite high, and it tends to invest more in far countries). Now, 
considering the evidence in Table 3 below, this characterization gains additional support: considering 
only investments in close countries, BT’s moves are much smaller (as shown by its stake in its close 
countries ventures and the size of such firms) than those of FT. 
Table 3: How much firms really invest in neighbouring countries? 
 Average stake in ventures 
in close countries 
 
Average number of 
clients in close countries 
France Telecom 
 
78% 6,25 million 
British Telecom 
 
42% 2.68 million 
Source and year?Source: Corporate reports - 2006 
JP: Also, profitability in close countries for BT should be less than for FT, right? (we are saying 
that our model could explain BT’s moves, particularly that the benefits reached through 
internationalization are not to be found only in the profits obtained abroad, and that some hidden 
benefits occur at home –which means that investments in close countries abroad are not primarily 
or only guided by its direct profitability, which should then be lower than for those cases –as 
presumably happens with FT– where diversification and expansion is done for traditional reasons). 
Can we reflect this in an additional column (showing profit per client obtained by each firm in close 
countries)? Also, could we add DT’s numbers (I bet you don’t have it, but DT should be one of our 
two best applications, jointly with BT, as it appears internationalize to close countries because it is 
not so powerful at home in Figure 2). 
THOSE ARE GOOD SUGGESTIONS. I’LL LOOK INTO THEM, BUT I DON’T HAVE THE 
DATA AT THE MOMENT.  
This leads, then, to the following proposition.  
Proposition 3: Leaving other business features aside, the convenience to internationalize 
increases with the higher credibility gained by becoming a multinational, which depends 
positively on the institutional closeness of the countries informed by M and on the correlation of 
the idiosyncratic cost parameters of the two countries. Internationalization for this reason, 
though, need not entail significant investments.  
Notice that, as a corollary of this proposition, firms that decide on the internationalization path entering 
markets abroad instead of limiting their activities to their home countries where they are incumbents, find 
a positive externality at home when the new markets they enter would serve as a benchmark and point of 
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comparison; as this positive externality is higher in more mature and correlated markets, this would 
explain business strategies whereby long-time dominant players at home markets in developed countries 
choose to enter neighbouring and institutionally similar markets despite obtaining a lower rate of return 
on the accounted investments abroad (than that obtained for instance in less developed and more distant 
countries, with higher growth potential, where their strategies will not so seriously enhance their 
credibility at home). In other words, the differential profitability of expansions overseas might be missing 
the different positive externalities obtained at home from various different destinies abroad, higher from 
investments in “close countries” that accounting figures would judge as mediocre or simply unprofitable 
(implicitly assuming that benefits at home in the absence of that particular diversification would have 
been the same as those obtained after the international expansion). 
Finally, we can think of I and E as two multinational firms, both of them reporting verifiable information 
that is still biased but less so than when they don’t need to care about consistency of reports sent across 
countries. In this case, G could announce an auditing of the decision adopted by R regarding how she 
treated these two reports, weighting them according to the relevance attached to the country about which 
each M is submitting cost information. This situation can be summarized –vis-à-vis the case where no 
multinational was involved– as one where the parameter θ increases and the support of the cost function 
shrinks in the two end points (i.e., Cmin increases and Cmax decreases). While the increased credibility of a 
multinational depends on the significance given to its report vis-à-vis the other multinational’s report, the 
two firms can now “commit” to a lower support offered to the regulator due to the fact that the latter 
becomes less prone to exchange biases in policies for supports that could lead her to a high penalty if G 
finds her to have been captured by one of the two interests offering transfers/supports.  
Notice, further, that since the reports sent in by the two firms are closer to each other, and they still 
contain the true state of nature C as an intermediate value, higher government officials can be sure that 
the expected bias in policy is now lower than without multinational firms. Indeed, G’s ability to monitor 
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R’s behaviour is significantly improved by inducing the regulator to justify departures from policy based 
on reports that are less extreme and that reduce her discretion. 
This leads, then, to our last proposition. 
Proposition 4: When two competing multinationals are active in one country, the discretion 
enjoyed by the regulator is reduced, reducing the variability / indeterminacy to which higher 
political officials (and final users) are exposed. The highest benefit goes to the multinational firm 
submitting information about a country considered to be more relevant by government officials. 
5. Summary - Discussion  
This paper has attempted a step toward a better understanding of why and how regulated firms diversify 
and, more precisely, why international diversification creates a specific advantage, which has not been 
identified by previous literature, compared to product diversification. The model developed here formally 
demonstrates that international diversification might make sense for some regulated firms even if they do 
not expect direct benefits from the international venture itself, and also allows us to identify the cases in 
which this occurs. We do not argue that building credibility is the only motive driving international 
acquisitions of regulated firms, nor that informational lobbying is restricted to such strategy, but instead 
that this logic might play an important role among other factors and in certain situations.  
The following discussion considers some empirical implications, with testable hypothesis, coming out 
from our model (particularly from Proposition 3). 
Types of diversification. Considering variations in the importance given to foreign countries as 
benchmark or informational source in the home country (previously summarized by the expected penalty 
faced by each regulator for disregarding M’s report), various types of diversification can be expected. If 
this importance is low, then firms will be less inclined to use international expansion as a way to 
overcome the credibility problem they face towards their domestic regulator. On the other hand, this 
becomes an option as soon as the importance given to such benchmark reports becomes high. From this 
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analysis, the following conceptual framework (Table 4 below) emerges to account for the diversification 
strategies of regulated firms. 
Even if the key contribution of our paper can be seen as being in cell (4) in Table 4, the other cells also 
stem from our formal framework and can be used to guide future empirical research. Clear predictions 
follow: ceteris paribus, international expansion will be the highest for firms in cell (4), diversification in 
regulated products will happen mainly for firms in cell (1), and diversification in unrelated products for 
firms in cell (3).   
Table 4. Regulated firms’ nonmarket strategies and diversification 
 Dominant in domestic 
nonmarket arena 
Non-dominant in domestic 
nonmarket arena 
Low importance given to 
information from foreign 
country 
(1) 
Least degree of international 
expansion. Diversification in 
regulated products 
 
(2) 
Poor options. International 
expansion will not help solve 
domestic problems. The firm rather 
diversifies in unregulated activities 
 
High importance given to 
information from foreign 
country  
 
(3) 
Indeterminate – Mix of 
geographical diversification and 
diversification in regulated 
products  
(4) 
Mainly international expansion as a 
way to solve the credibility 
problem 
Variation in target countries. Linked to the importance given to foreign countries as benchmark or 
informational source in the home country, interesting predictions come up when we consider the type of 
countries that regulated firms are likely to target. In effect, in our framework, a foreign country can be a 
good target for a regulated firm for two different reasons: (1) because there is market growth or 
possibilities to get a monopoly position (traditional reasons), and (2) because it helps to solve the 
credibility problem (a new reason provided in this paper). 
For regulated firms in developed countries, investing in geographically close countries is rarely going to 
be very attractive for traditional reasons, both because competition is tough and growth perspectives are 
low there. However, a close developed country can be attractive because it helps solve the credibility 
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problem. On the other hand, diversification in far countries (especially developing countries) is more 
attractive for traditional reasons (stronger market growth and therefore higher expected pay-offs). Yet, 
operating in developing countries will probably not help much to enhance the firm’s credibility toward 
the regulator in its domestic country. 
Thus, an important implication follows: commercial benefits of investing in developing countries need to 
be much higher –even correcting by higher cost of capital or risk– than investments expanding operations 
to neighbour or developed countries. The theory behind this proposition is that investing in developed 
countries buys credibility at home, and therefore its true pay-off should include better results at home than 
the (correct but unobservable) counter-factual, where incumbents would suffer higher entry or more 
demanding access regulation.  
Contributions 
This paper makes contributions to three literatures. First, it contributes to the International Business 
literature by looking at specific benefits of internationalization. Irrespective of whether a firm has a 
competitive advantage or some non-tradable or hard-to-imitate assets, i.e. the factors that are seen as 
major ones explaining the success of international strategies (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1979), 
its internationalization moves might be successful. In the case of regulated firms, we show that this might 
come from the credibility enhancement that the firm gets in its home market vis-à-vis the regulator. Our 
argument complements but is also different from the ‘liability of foreignness’ argument (Zaheer, 1995) or 
studies which argue that firms invest in neighbouring countries because their knowledge and capabilities 
are sufficiently close to make the investment attractive (Markusen, 2004). The common point is that, for 
both reasons, firms will often end up investing in countries that are close to them institutionally. 
However, our explanation does not build on any assumptions regarding resources and capabilities 
associated to the target country. On the other hand, we argue that regulated firms with limited control of 
the regulatory process at home have an additional reason to invest in neighbouring countries (and thus 
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would tend to do so more often, perhaps in small amounts) to enhance their own credibility vis-à-vis the 
regulator in their home country.  
It also provides a rationale for the puzzle underlined by Holburn (2001), i.e. that regulated firms tend to 
invest in countries whose regulated sectors have market structures (from monopsony to competition) 
similar to the market structure of the firm’s home country. In our framework, comparisons related to 
prices and costs are indeed going to be much easier for the regulator when market structures are 
comparable.  
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on nonmarket strategies, and more precisely on how firms 
can integrate market and nonmarket strategies (Baron, 1995, 2001). The general idea in the existing 
literature is that nonmarket strategies complement market strategies, by making market entry possible, by 
overcoming regulatory hurdles in the case of a new technology launch, increasing competitors’ costs, etc. 
(Yoffie and Bergenstein, 1985). In the situation presented here, however, we go one step further in this 
idea about the integration of market and nonmarket activities. In effect, we present a situation here in 
which the regulated firm attempts in its home market to support its market position through political 
support but, because this support is not so effective, the firm develops a market strategy 
(internationalization) that will strengthen its nonmarket activities (by gaining credibility or incidence at 
home). In the end, a market strategy is developed to support a nonmarket one, a situation that has not been 
highlighted in the literature yet. 
Regarding nonmarket strategies, our paper also contributes to the literature on the combination of various 
nonmarket activities (Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002), by showing how traditional political support 
(votes, campaign contributions) and informational lobbying can be combined.  
Third, this paper can also provide insights regarding public policy. The economic theory of regulation 
generally considers a theoretical set-up with one regulator and one (or several) regulated firms in one 
country-market. The result is that the information asymmetry makes it difficult for the regulator to 
efficiently regulate this type of situation. What happens then when regulated firms are multinationals and 
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operate in several markets? Our model suggests that, in this case, the regulator has less discretion and thus 
her political superiors (who represent final users) might find a way better control the regulatory authority 
delegated, avoiding it to be too biased and dependent of the relative nonmarket efforts regarding lobbying 
and supports offered to those regulators.  
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